27 research outputs found
Automatic Search of Truncated Impossible Differentials for Word-Oriented Block Ciphers (Full Version)
Impossible differential cryptanalysis is a powerful technique to recover the secret key of block ciphers by
exploiting the fact that in block ciphers specific input and output
differences are not compatible.
This paper introduces a novel tool to search truncated impossible differentials for
word-oriented block ciphers with bijective Sboxes. Our tool generalizes the earlier
-method and the UID-method. It allows to reduce
the gap between the best impossible differentials found by these methods and the best known
differentials found by ad hoc methods that rely on cryptanalytic insights.
The time and space complexities of our tool in judging an -round truncated impossible differential are about and respectively,
where is the number of words in the plaintext and , are constants depending on the machine and the block cipher.
In order to demonstrate the strength of our tool, we show that it does not only allow to automatically rediscover the
longest truncated impossible differentials of many word-oriented block ciphers, but also finds new
results. It independently rediscovers all 72 known truncated impossible differentials on 9-round CLEFIA.
In addition, finds new truncated impossible differentials for AES, ARIA, Camellia without
FL and FL layers, E2, LBlock, MIBS and Piccolo.
Although our tool does
not improve the lengths of impossible differentials for existing block ciphers, it helps to
close the gap between the best known results of previous tools and those of manual cryptanalysis
Security Evaluation against Differential Cryptanalysis for Block Cipher Structures
Estimating immunity against differential and linear cryptanalysis is essential in designing secure block ciphers. A practical measure to achieve it is to find the minimal number of active S-boxes, or a lower bound for this minimal number. In this paper, we provide a general algorithm using integer programming, which not only can estimate a good lower bound of the minimal differential active S-boxes for various block cipher structures, but also provides an efficient way to select new structures with good properties against differential cryptanalysis. Experimental results for the Feistel, CAST256, SMS4, CLEFIA and Generalized Feistel structures indicate that bounds obtained by our algorithm are the tightest except for a few rounds of the SMS4 structure. Then, for the first time, bounds of the differential active S-boxes number for the MISTY1, Skipjack, MARS and Four-cell structures are illustrated with the application of our algorithm. Finally, our algorithm is used to find four new structures with good properties against differential cryptanalysis. Security evaluation against liner cryptanalysis can be processed with our algorithm similarly by considering dual structures
A Flaw in The Internal State Recovery Attack on ALPHA-MAC
An distinguisher was constructed by utilizing a 2-round collision
differential path of ALPHA-MAC, with about chosen
messages and queries. Then, this distinguisher was used
to recover the internal state(\cite{Yuan1},\cite{Yuan2}).
However, a flaw is found in the internal state recovery attack. The
complexity of recovering the internal state is up to exhaustive
search. And the complexity of the whole attack will be up to chosen
messages and exhaustive search. To repair
the flaw, a modified 2-round differential path of ALPHA-MAC is present and a new distinguisher based on this path is proposed. Finally,
an attack with about chosen messages and queries
is obtained under the new distinguisher
Effectiveness of Inactivated SARS-CoV-2 Vaccines During a Delta Variant Outbreak in Hunan Province, China: A Retrospective Cohort Study
This study was aimed at investigating the effectiveness of inactivated COVID-19 vaccines against the Delta variant. We performed a retrospective cohort study of close contacts of people with laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infections in Hunan province, China, from July to August 2021. Mixed-effect logistic regression was used to estimate vaccine effectiveness (VE), and analyze the effects of the vaccination status of index cases and the exposure risk level on VE estimation. A total of 1,685 close contacts of 126 index cases were included; 835 (49.6%) had received two doses of inactivated vaccines, and the median interval between the 2nd dose and exposure was 48 days (IQR: 41 to 56 days). Full vaccination was defined as two doses at least 14 days before exposure. Adjusted VE estimates for full vaccination were 54.8% (95% CI: 7.7 to 77.9) and 68.4% (95% CI: 8.5 to 89.1) against symptomatic and moderate-to-severe COVID-19, respectively. VE for inactivated vaccines was difficult to observe if index cases had been fully vaccinated. The estimated VE with respect to infection protection was lower among household than non-household contacts. Complete primary immunization of two-dose inactivated COVID-19 vaccines protected against SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant infection. Infection risk was higher among vaccinated household contacts than vaccinated non-household contacts
recursive diffusion layers for (lightweight) block ciphers and hash functions
Diffusion layers with maximum branch numbers are widely used in block ciphers and hash functions. In this paper, we construct recursive diffusion layers using Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs). Unlike the MDS matrix used in AES, whose elements are limited in a finite field, a diffusion layer in this paper is a square matrix composed of linear transformations over a vector space. Perfect diffusion layers with branch numbers from 5 to 9 are constructed. On the one hand, we revisit the design strategy of PHOTON lightweight hash family and the work of FSE 2012, in which perfect diffusion layers are constructed by one bundle-based LFSR. We get better results and they can be used to replace those of PHOTON to gain smaller hardware implementations. On the other hand, we investigate new strategies to construct perfect diffusion layers using more than one bundle-based LFSRs. Finally, we construct perfect diffusion layers by increasing the number of iterations and using bit-level LFSRs. Since most of our proposals have lightweight examples corresponding to 4-bit and 8-bit Sboxes, we expect that they will be useful in designing (lightweight) block ciphers and (lightweight) hash functions. © 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering; Faculty of Engineering; Office of Vice President - Research, University of WindsorDiffusion layers with maximum branch numbers are widely used in block ciphers and hash functions. In this paper, we construct recursive diffusion layers using Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs). Unlike the MDS matrix used in AES, whose elements are limited in a finite field, a diffusion layer in this paper is a square matrix composed of linear transformations over a vector space. Perfect diffusion layers with branch numbers from 5 to 9 are constructed. On the one hand, we revisit the design strategy of PHOTON lightweight hash family and the work of FSE 2012, in which perfect diffusion layers are constructed by one bundle-based LFSR. We get better results and they can be used to replace those of PHOTON to gain smaller hardware implementations. On the other hand, we investigate new strategies to construct perfect diffusion layers using more than one bundle-based LFSRs. Finally, we construct perfect diffusion layers by increasing the number of iterations and using bit-level LFSRs. Since most of our proposals have lightweight examples corresponding to 4-bit and 8-bit Sboxes, we expect that they will be useful in designing (lightweight) block ciphers and (lightweight) hash functions. © 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
automatic search of truncated impossible differentials for word-oriented block ciphers
Impossible differential cryptanalysis is a powerful technique to recover the secret key of block ciphers by exploiting the fact that in block ciphers specific input and output differences are not compatible. This paper introduces a novel tool to search truncated impossible differentials for word-oriented block ciphers with bijective Sboxes. Our tool generalizes the earlier μ-method and the UID-method. It allows to reduce the gap between the best impossible differentials found by these methods and the best known differentials found by ad hoc methods that rely on cryptanalytic insights. The time and space complexities of our tool in judging an r-round truncated impossible differential are about O(c·l4·r4) and O(c′·l2·r2) respectively, where l is the number of words in the plaintext and c, c′ are constants depending on the machine and the block cipher. In order to demonstrate the strength of our tool, we show that it does not only allow to automatically rediscover the longest truncated impossible differentials of many word-oriented block ciphers, but also finds new results. It independently rediscovers all 72 known truncated impossible differentials on 9-round CLEFIA. In addition, it finds new truncated impossible differentials for AES, ARIA, Camellia without FL and FL-1 layers, E2, LBlock, MIBS and Piccolo. Although our tool does not improve the lengths of impossible differentials for existing block ciphers, it helps to close the gap between the best known results of previous tools and those of manual cryptanalysis. © Springer-Verlag 2012.Defence Research and Developement Organization (D.R.D.O.); Google Inc.; Microsoft Research; National Board of Higher Mathematics (N.B.H.M.); Reserve Bank of India (R.B.I.); Tata Consultancy Services (T.C.S.)Impossible differential cryptanalysis is a powerful technique to recover the secret key of block ciphers by exploiting the fact that in block ciphers specific input and output differences are not compatible. This paper introduces a novel tool to search truncated impossible differentials for word-oriented block ciphers with bijective Sboxes. Our tool generalizes the earlier μ-method and the UID-method. It allows to reduce the gap between the best impossible differentials found by these methods and the best known differentials found by ad hoc methods that rely on cryptanalytic insights. The time and space complexities of our tool in judging an r-round truncated impossible differential are about O(c·l4·r4) and O(c′·l2·r2) respectively, where l is the number of words in the plaintext and c, c′ are constants depending on the machine and the block cipher. In order to demonstrate the strength of our tool, we show that it does not only allow to automatically rediscover the longest truncated impossible differentials of many word-oriented block ciphers, but also finds new results. It independently rediscovers all 72 known truncated impossible differentials on 9-round CLEFIA. In addition, it finds new truncated impossible differentials for AES, ARIA, Camellia without FL and FL-1 layers, E2, LBlock, MIBS and Piccolo. Although our tool does not improve the lengths of impossible differentials for existing block ciphers, it helps to close the gap between the best known results of previous tools and those of manual cryptanalysis. © Springer-Verlag 2012